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26

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78-2-2(3)0). By order dated July 18, 2005, the Utah
Supreme Court, pursuant to its authority found in UCA § 78-2-2(4), transferred this case
to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
pursuant to the provisions of UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE NUMBER 1

Did the district court err when it refused to vacate default judgment despite its
having no jurisdiction over the matter, the Fullingims never having been properly served
with summons and the Amended Complaint? (Issue preserved: R. 95, 100-106, 178-181)
Standard of Review
"A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is based
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom
it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the
decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the
district court." Jackson Constr. Co, v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, | 8, 100 P.3d 1211.
ISSUE NUMBER 2

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the Fullingims' motion for
relief from judgment when the district court clerk had entered default judgment in
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violation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure ("URCP") 55(b)(1)? (Issue preserved: R. 95,
106-107, 181-182.)
Standard of Review
The appellate courts "will generally reverse a trial court's denial of a rule 60(b)
motion only where the court has exceeded its discretion." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92,
Tf7, 104 P.3d 1198. "A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance,
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, TJ9, 11 P.3d 277.
ISSUE NUMBER 3

Did the district court err by denying the Fullingims' motion for relief from
judgment based on its conclusion that the Fullingims had not proffered a meritorious
defense? (Issue preserved: R. 181.)
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews "for correctness the trial court's determination of
whether a defense is meritorious." Lund v. Brown , 2000 UT 75, If 12, 11 P.3d 277.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
URCP, Rules 4(d), 5(b), 55(b)(1), and 60(b)(1)
The full text of each of these Rules is appended to this brief at Tab A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in this case on June 2, 2005,
denying the Fullingims' Motion for Relief from Judgment.

4850-173 7-8560.FU001.001
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THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On September 13, 2002, Plaintiff/Appellee,

Smith Springs LLC ("Smith

Springs"), filed a complaint against the FuUingims in the Second Judicial District Court.
(R. 1-8.) The district court, on February 12, 2003, ordered this case to "be dismissed,
without prejudice, for failure to serve [the FuUingims] within 120 days of filing the
Complaint" pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the URCP. (R. 9.) Twenty-six days later, on March
10, 2003, six months (less a day) after the original complaint had been filed, Smith
Springs filed a First Amended Complaint. (R. 11-18.) At the same time, Smith Springs
also filed a Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail (R. 19-20), and an Affidavit
of Andrea Dover (R. 21-26.) On March 18, 2003, the district court notified Smith
Springs's counsel to submit a motion to set aside the dismissal entered on February 12,
2003. (Docket entry for March 18, 2003. The docket is appended hereto at Tab B.)
Prompted by this notification, Smith Springs filed on March 21, 2003, an Ex-Parte
Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint (R. 44-45) with a memorandum in support (R.
31-34), attaching the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail and the Affidavit
of Andrea Dover (R. 35-42).
The district court issued a memorandum decision granting the Motion to Reinstate
Plaintiffs Complaint and the Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail on April
14, 2003. (R. 48-49.) An Order Granting Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs Complaint was
entered by the district court on May 12, 2003. (R. 52.) On June 10, 2003, the court
entered an Order Granting Service by Publication and/or by Mail. (R. 54-55). Smith
Springs submitted what it claimed to be proof of service in compliance with this Order on
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June 23, 2003. (R. 56.) Based on this certification and the failure of the Fullingims to
appear, a deputy court clerk on August 20, 2003, signed a Default Certificate. (R. 68). On
October 3, 2003, a deputy court clerk signed a Default Judgment filed on October 14,
2003 (R. 77-78), and on November 20, 2003, the court entered an order permitting Smith
Springs to "turn off the water to the Fullingim's [sic] property," to "require a
reconnection fee, if and when the Fullingims bring their delinquency current," and to
"further increase the fees charged for water service" (R. 91-92).
Because the Fullingims never knew that Smith Springs had filed a complaint
against them, they never appeared in court prior to the entry of the default judgment. On
January 10, 2005, the Fullingims filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment, requesting that
the district court set aside the October 14, 2003, Default Judgment and the Order of
November 20, 2003. (R. 95-97.) After receiving memoranda from both sides concerning
the motion, the district court denied the Fullingims' motion in a memorandum decision
dated April 26, 2005. (R. 187-188.) Following entry of the Order Denying Defendants
Motion for Relief from Judgment (R. 191), the Fullingims timely filed a notice of appeal
(R. 194-195).
STATEMENT

OF RELEVANT

FACTS

On or about March 18, 2002, the Fullingims retained Steven E. Clyde of CLYDE,
SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON, to represent them in their dispute with Smith Springs over
the use of a well. (Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde ("Clyde Aff") H 2 (R. 112.)) Mr. Clyde
informed counsel for Smith Springs by letter, dated March 18, 2002, that he had been
retained by the Fullingims and that he needed to get familiar with the situation. (Id. at ^f 3.
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(R. 112, 116.)) Although this letter was sent to Smith Springs's counsel some six months
before the original complaint was filed in September 2002, it expressly informed Smith
Springs that Mr. Clyde represented the Fullingims in the very controversy that became
the subject of the complaint. After about April 3, 2002, Mr. Clyde had no further contact
with Smith Springs's counsel (Id. at Tf 8. (R. 113)); had he been contacted by Smith
Springs, however, Mr. Clyde would have contacted his clients, the Fullingims, and
sought their permission to accept service of process on their behalf. (Id. at ^f 7. (R. 113.))
Only after the Default Judgment was entered and the Order was signed did the
Fullingims learn of the entry of Default Judgment against them. The Fullingims contacted
Mr. Clyde, to discover whether he had ever been notified of the Complaint. Mr. Clyde
informed the Fullingims that he had not received any notice about the filing of the
complaint and was not aware of the complaint even though he had notified David L.
Knowles, Smith Springs's attorney, that he had been retained by the Fullingims to
represent them.
The Fullingims were never personally served with a copy of Summons or the
Complaint. Nor was service ever obtained on the Fullingims by certified mail. (Affidavit
of John P. Fullingim ("Fullingim Aff") ffif 10, 11 (R. 118.)) The Fullingims did not
recall seeing any cards from a deputy sheriff left at their house in Texas. (Id. at If 7.) They
were not informed that anyone had been trying to serve papers at their Texas residence.
(Id. at Tj 6.) While away from their Texas residence, certified mail may have been refused
by the Fullingims' housekeeper or employees who had access to the residence. (Id. at f
8.) However, in such events the Fullingims expected to be informed of such actions, and
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they were not informed of any such actions in their absence. (Id. at K 9.) The Fullingims
did not intentionally avoid service and were unaware that Smith Springs was trying to
serve them with papers. (Id. at ^ 11.) However, if the Fullingims had been contacted by
Mr. Clyde, they would have authorized him to accept service of process in this matter.
( M a t t 12.)
Despite the fact that Smith Springs's counsel knew the Fullingims had retained
Utah legal counsel, knew who that counsel was, and had been in contact with their
counsel prior to the filing of the complaint, Smith Springs never attempted to contact the
Fullingims5 counsel concerning accepting service of the complaint. (Affidavit of David
L. Knowles, ^ 6, 10. (R. 139.)) Instead, Smith Springs sought and obtained leave from
the court to perfect service by alternative means. When it sought to obtain permission for
service by alternative means, Plaintiff failed to inform the court that it knew the
Fullingims were represented by Utah legal counsel and had earlier been in contact with
that counsel prior to the time the complaint was filed. None of the means of service
attempted by Plaintiff gave the Fullingims actual knowledge of the existence of
Plaintiffs complaint against them. (Fullingim Aff. ^ 11. (R. 118.))
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court erred in denying the Fullingims' Motion for Relief from
Judgment. The district court premised its denial upon its conclusion that Smith Springs
had complied with the reasonable diligence requirements in its attempts to serve the
Fullingims and that the Fullingims' request was untimely and unsupported by a
meritorious defense.

4850-1737-8560 FU001 001
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While it made representations that it had attempted to serve the Fullingims several times
without success, Smith Springs failed to inform the district court that it knew the
Fullingims were represented by Utah counsel but never attempted to contact their counsel
to accept service of process.
The default judgment entered by the district court clerk is void. Smith Springs
never properly served the Fullingims, who had, as a result, no actual notice that the case
had been filed against them. Moreover, the default judgment against the Fullingims was
entered, not by the district court upon application, but by the district court clerk, contrary
to the express provisions of URCP Rule 55.
Because the default judgment is void, the Fullingims were not obligated to file its
Motion for Relief from Judgment within a specified amount of time or present
meritorious defenses against Smith Springs's claims; if meritorious defenses are required,
however, the Fullingims' pleadings set out the necessary minimum showing.
Given these circumstances—that the default judgment is void for lack of service
and improper entry, and that the meritorious defenses are unnecessary or satisfied—the
Fullingims submit that the default judgment entered against them must be set aside.
ARGUMENT
URCP Rule 60(b) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding" if, among various other possibilities, "the judgment
is void." URAP Rule 60(b)(4). In the present dispute, the district court's June 1, 2005,
Order Denying [the Fullingims 'J Motion for Relief from Judgment is, in fact, void as a
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result of Smith Springs' failure to effect proper service of process as required by URCP
Rule 4. The district court, evidently believing that Smith Springs had "fully complied
with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by exercising reasonable diligence and
good faith in their attempts to serve [the Fullingims]" (R. 191), determined that the
default judgment entered against the Fullingims "was not void for lack of jurisdiction"
(id.). This conclusion, however, cannot withstand scrutiny under Utah law, for although
Smith Springs sought and received permission to serve the Fullingims by alternative
means, it did not exercise reasonable diligence before resorting to those alternative
means, nor did it inform the district court of the simple, existing alternative means which
would have guaranteed actual notice to the Fullingims, i.e., contacting Steven E. Clyde,
Fullingims Utah counsel.
The judgment thus obtained by Smith Springs was reared upon the nonexistent
foundation of improper service, depriving the district court of jurisdiction over the
Fullingims. Personal jurisdiction being indispensable to the effectiveness of any order
promulgated by a district court, its lack left the district court in the present matter without
jurisdiction to enter the default judgment at issue, and this Court must therefore overturn
the district court's erroneous Order and direct it to grant Fullingims motion for Relief
from Judgment.

4850-1737-8560.FU001.001
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—I—
SMITH SPRINGS FAILED TO EFFECT PROPER SERVICE UPON THE
FULLINGIMS,4)EPRIVING THE DISTRICT COURT OF
JURISDICTION AND RENDERING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
VOID.

A.

Jurisdiction Can Exist Only Where the
Defendant has been Given Some Notice of
the Pending Action.

A court can only acquire jurisdiction over the parties through "proper issuance and
service of summons." Jackson Constr. Co., 2004 UT 89, TflO, 100 P.3d at 1214. Under
URCP Rule 4, a plaintiff may serve a defendant personally or by certified mail. See
URCP Rule 4(d)(1)(A) or 4(d)(2)(A). Irrespective of the method used, "[d]ue process of
law requires that before one can be bound by a judgment affecting his property right,
some process must be served upon him which in some degree at least is calculated to give
him notice." Naisbitt v. Herrick, 290 P. 950, 954 (Utah 1930).
In Naisbitt, the plaintiff sought to quiet title to certain real property in Weber
County, against known and unknown persons claiming interest in the property. Id. at 951.
Service upon these various unnamed "persons" was made by publication. Id. After the
plaintiff obtained a judgment quieting his title to the property, one Theodore Gajewsky
who was not named in the suit, and who, consequently, had not been personally served
with a summons, appeared and sought to set the judgment aside. See id. Gajewsky
asserted that he had been in exclusive possession of the property, was the owner of the
property, and was entitled to exclusive possession of the property. See id. at 951-52. In its
ruling, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[d]ue process of law requires that before one
can be bound by a judgment affecting his property right, some process must be served
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upon him which in some degree at least is calculated to give him notice." Id. at 954.
More recently, Utah courts have stated "[a] fundamental requirement of due
process, as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is
that notice be given that 'is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.'" Provo River Water Users' Assyn v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah
1993) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that this notice requirement
is "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality." Mulane, 339 U.S. at 314. The Court further explained that
"[t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315.
"Whether service of process [is] proper is a jurisdictional issue." Bonneville
Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Garcia v. Garcia, 712
P.2d 288, 290 n.4 (Utah 1986)). When "service of summons [is] fatally defective, the
judgment entered pursuant thereto is without force or effect," Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah
2d 249, 461 P.2d 465, 466 (Utah 1969), because "'[a] lack of [personal jurisdiction] is
fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with respect to a particular litigant."' Jackson
Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, \%, 100 P.3d 1211 (quoting State v. Vijil, 784 P.2d
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted)). Thus, "[w]here there is no service of
summons," any judgment rendered "is void." State Tax Comm 'n v. Larsen, 100 Utah 103,
110 P.2d 558, 560 (1941); see also Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d
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382, 385 (Utah App. 1991) ("[A] judgment ... is void ... if the court that rendered it
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties or if the court acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process.")(citation omitted; alteration in original); Martin v. Nelson,
533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975) (Judgment vacated due to lack of jurisdiction based upon
falsified return of service and insufficient time for filing of answer).

B.

The Fullingims Never Received Proper
Notice of the Smith Springs Complaint.
1.

The Fullingims were Never Personally
Served.

Although Smith Springs presented evidence to the district court that it attempted to
serve the Fullingims both personally and by certified mail, it nevertheless admits that it
was unable to perfect service by either method {Affidavit of Andrea Dover {"Dover
Affidavit"), R. 37-38). Through a note provided by a deputy sheriff in Dallas County,
Texas, which was attached to the Dover Affidavit, Smith Springs presented evidence that
between December 9, 2002, and February 14, 2003, eight attempts were made to serve
papers on the Fullingims (R. 39). According to the deputy sheriffs note, contact was
made with a lady, who informed the deputy sheriff that the Fullingims were in Utah until
the middle of January. Additionally, the deputy sheriffs note asserts that he left several
cards at the door to call him. The deputy sheriffs note concludes with his opinion that the
Fullingims were avoiding papers. Smith Springs also presented evidence, also attached to
the Dover Affidavit, that a copy of the complaint sent to the Fullingims by certified mail
was returned unclaimed (R. 40-42).

4850-1737-8560 FU001 001

13

The Fullingims, however, were not served at all, either personally or by certified
mail {Affidavit of John P. Fullingim ("Fullingim Affidavit"), R. 117-18). They were in
Utah during some of the time that the deputy sheriff in Texas was allegedly trying to
serve them at their Texas address; however, when they returned to Texas they never
received or saw any cards, contrary to the statement by the Texas process server, and
were never informed that anyone had been trying to serve papers on them in their absence
(id., R. 118). During the time that they were in Utah, the Fullingims resided at their house
across the street from one of the members of Smith Springs, Keith Smith (id., f 5, R.
118). Smith Springs thus knew or should have known that the Fullingims were in Utah
and could have been served in Utah at that time.1
2.

Sm ith Springs Never Effected Proper
Alternative Service upon the Fullingims.

1

Smith Springs presented evidence in response to the Fullingims' Motion for
Relief from Judgment that it did try to serve the Fullingims in Utah. (R. at 033) However,
this attempt occurred in March, 2003 after the case had been dismissed without prejudice
and when the Fullingims had already returned to Texas, and the deputy sheriff returned
the papers to Smith Springs because they were informed by someone at the Fullingim's
Utah residence that it was a rental and that the Fullingims were in Texas.
2

One of the more troubling aspects of this matter is the fact that Smith Springs
sought permission for alternative service after the case had been dismissed. The trial
court dismissed Smith Springs' Complaint on February 12, 2003 (R. 9), over 150 days
after its filing. Smith Springs filed its Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail
on March 10, 2003, 26 days later. The trial court, despite no longer having jurisdiction
due to its having dismissed the case, thereupon requested a Motion to Reinstate Plaintiffs
Complaint (a motion for which no provision exists in the URCP), which was filed on
March 21, 2003, 37 days after the case had been dismissed. The trial court then granted
both the reinstatement and the alternative-service motions (R. 52-55).
While it is clear that a trial court may "extend the time for service ..., even if the
time has expired," State v. Z.F., 2001 UT App 132, No. 20001084-CA, 2001 WL 422947
(Utah App.), at *2 (April 19, 2001) (unreported, copy attached at Tab C), it is equally
clear that such an extension must take place before the case is dismissed, Callahan v.
Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Unless and until a cause of action
4850-173 7-8560.FU001.001
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The Fullingims do not recall ever being sent, or rejecting, certified letters from
Smith Springs (Fullingim Affidavit Iff 8-10, R. 118), although after obtaining leave to use
alternative means of service, Smith Springs provided some evidence that it had sent a
copy of its Complaint by certified mail, which was returned marked "refused" on June
18, 2003 (R. 40-42). This is immaterial, however, inasmuch as Smith Springs obtained
leave for alternative service improperly, and failed as well to satisfy the reasonable
diligence requirement upon which such leave is based.
Smith Springs' request for permission to serve the Fullingims by alternative means
(R. 35-36) was improperly based upon a misleading affidavit. According to Rule
4(d)(4)(A),
[w]here the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown
and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon
all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is
avoiding service of process,3 the party seeking service of process may file a
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by
publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth
the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served.
is dismissed, a party who fails to serve a summons in a timely fashion may preserve the
action under proper circumstances.").
Logically, a plaintiff cannot simply begin with "avoiding service of process"
without having first attempted to locate the proposed defendant "through reasonable
diligence." In the present case, because Smith Springs never satisfied its duty of
reasonable diligence, it cannot simply point to what it considers to be avoidance of
service, which the Fullingims strenuously dispute, to justify its failure to secure proper
service. See, e.g., Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1276 (Utah 1987) (Pointing out that a
plaintiff cannot satisfy due process or Rule 4(d) (then Rule 4(f)) by making substitute
service "without first having shown that diligent efforts have been made to locate the
defendant").
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URCP 4(d)(4)(A). On March 10, 2003, and again on March 21, 2003, Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Service by Publication and/or by Mail. The Motion was supported by the
Dover Affidavit, in which Andrea Dover states that service was attempted on the
Fullingims by certified mail and by personal service. The Affidavit fails to set forth any
other efforts to locate the Fullingims, such as attempting to discover if they were in living
at their known address in Utah, across the street from Keith Smith, one of Smith Springs'
members. The Motion and Affidavit likewise fail to inform the Court that Smith Springs
knew both that the Fullingims were represented by Mr. Steven E. Clyde of Clyde, Snow,
Sessions & Swenson, located in Salt Lake City, Utah and that Mr. Clyde had been in
contact with Smith Springs' counsel {Clyde Affidavit ffl| 3, 5 (R. 112, 113, 116)). These
fatal flaws invalidate the request and subsequent order for alternative service by
publication and/or by mail.
"To meet the reasonable diligence requirement a plaintiff must take advantage of
readily available sources of relevant information. A plaintiff who focuses on one or two
sources, while turning a blind eye to the existence of other available sources, falls short
of this standard." Jackson Construction, 2004 UT 89, at f20. In Naisbitt {supra), a Mr.
Gajewsky, who was not a named party and had not been personally served, claimed to be
in exclusive possession of the property at issue therein, and sought to have judgment
quieting title set aside. Naisbitt, in whom title had been quieted, however, argued that
service by publication, which he had effected, sufficed to notify Gajewsky of the action.
The Supreme Court disagreed:

4850-1737-8560 FU001 001

16

If it be true that [Gajewsky] was in possession of the premises involved in
this proceeding at the time suit was begun and thereafter, [Naisbitt] may not
be heard to say that [Gajewsky] was an unknown claimant of the premises
and thereby secure service of process by publication.
290 P. at 954. To the contrary, Utah's courts have long championed the responsibility of
a plaintiff to diligently explore all reasonable options in order to secure service and
thereby satisfy the demands of constitutional due process.
In a more recent case, Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), this Court discussed Rule 4's diligence requirement at length. In Bonneville, a
party had brought a motion for alternative service based on an affidavit identifying
attempts to serve the defendant and justifying facts. Id. at 770. After default judgment
was entered, the defendant appeared and showed that the affidavit contained false,
possibly even intentionally misleading, statements. This Court explained that
[t]he diligence to be pursued and shown by the affidavit is that which is
reasonable under the circumstances and not all possible diligence which
may be conceived. Norf, howeverJ is it that diligence which stops just
short of the place where if it were continued might reasonably be
expected to uncover an address ... of the person on whom service is
sought. There have been cases where [a] plaintiff ... like a person who
bustles with activity but accomplishes little, makes an imposing recital of
nonproductive diligence. Such type of "diligence" when probed may reveal
a design to draw attention away from the fact that a further pursuit might
result in an unwelcome disclosure of the actual address of the defendant.
Due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It is
that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which
is reasonably calculated to do so.
Id. at 775 (quoting Parker v. Rossf 117 Utah 417, 427-28, 217 P.2d 373, 379 (Utah 1950)
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added; other citations omitted). "[I]f a
plaintiff falsely avers or intentionally misleads a court to believe that he or she has
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exercised such diligence when he or she has not done so," the Bonneville Court
concluded, "the [trial] court, although at the time appearing to have jurisdiction, never
had jurisdiction because the plaintiff never met the constitutional mandate." Id. at 773.
Although Smith Springs admittedly made some efforts to serve the summons on
the Fullingims in Texas, its flurry of activity, as described by the Bonneville Court,
amounted to a "bustle[ of] activity ... accomplishing] little," 949 P.2d at 775: an
"imposing recital of nonproductive diligence" when "further pursuit [would have]
resulted] in ... the actual address of the defendants]," id. In short, Smith Springs5
several attempts did not rise to the level of "reasonable diligence" under Utah Law.
Obviously, "reasonable diligence" does not entail the exhaustion of every conceivable
possibility to locate and serve a potential defendant, see Bonneville, 949 P.2d at 775; it
does, however, require that "a plaintiff... take advantage of readily available sources of
relevant information." Jackson Constr. Co., 2004 UT 89, f20, 100 P.3d at 1217
(emphasis added). In Jackson, the Utah Supreme Court held that the district court
erroneously granted a motion for alternative service because the plaintiff in that case did
not exercise reasonable diligence in seeking to serve process. Id. Tfl[4-5, 24. Though the
Jackson Construction Opinion dealt more with the location of a valid address, the
principle of the case is clear: that a plaintiff does not exercise "reasonable diligence"
when it "turn[s] a blind eye" to a "readily available" method for serving the defendant.
Id.
The facts and law of Jackson are plainly analogous to the circumstances of the
present dispute. Although Smith Springs exhaustively set forth in its supporting
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Affidavits various attempts at service, it gave no acceptable reason for having "turn[ed] a
blind eye" to the "readily available" method of contacting the Fullingims' Utah attorney,
Steven E. Clyde. According to URCP Rule 5(b)(1), "[w]henever under these rules service
is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service
shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court."
Smith Springs knew that the Fullingims were represented by Steven Clyde (see R. 116),
on this very matter but it made no attempt to contact him, or inform him that a complaint
had been filed against his clients.
Smith Springs asserted before the district court that "[i]n good faith, [Smith
Springs] had no reason to believe that service on the attorney would have been
successful." (R. 129.) To the contrary, however, Smith Springs' attorney had already
contacted Mr. Clyde (the Fullingims' counsel at the time) about this dispute prior to
commencing litigation. And Mr. Clyde had immediately responded and left a message
with Smith Springs' counsel the very next day (R. 139). There is no indication that
further contact with Mr. Clyde would have resulted in any less prompt response.
Smith Springs had a clear avenue of process calculated to give the Fullingims
actual notice—service upon the Fullingims' legal counsel, who had already contacted
Smith Springs' counsel, stating that he was representing the Fullingims in this matter.
Instead of informing the Court of this potential method of service, however, Smith
Springs instead intimated to the Court that there were no other avenues of service
available and obtained an order permitting service by publication and/or by mail.
Mr. Clyde's affidavit makes abundantly clear both that "[i]t is [his] habitual
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practice to accept service of process from opposing counsel on behalf of my clients to
avoid the necessity of service of process" and that "if [he] had been contacted by [Smith
Springs'] counsel, [he] would have sought [the Fullingims'] permission to accept service
of process of their behalf." (Clyde Affidavit ^[f 6 & 7, R. 113.) At the very least,
contacting Mr. Clyde would have given the Fullingims actual knowledge of the lawsuit,
something they never received until after the default was entered. Certainly, "ordinary
prudence" should have prompted Smith Springs to contact Mr. Clyde in an effort to serve
the Fullingims. At the very least, Plaintiff should have disclosed to the Court the
existence of this potential avenue of service before seeking alternative service.4
C.

Conclusion to Part I.

Although Smith Springs demonstrated an inability to serve the Fullingims by mail
or by personal service, it failed to inform the district court (a) that it knew the Fullingims
had retained local counsel for this very matter, (b) that it had made no effort to contact or
submit service to that counsel, or (c) that it had not attempted to serve the Fullingims
while they were in Utah. Because Smith Springs obtained of the district court leave to
undertake alternative service while withholding this key information, the district court
permitted alternative service when it should not have. As a result, the Fullingims were
never properly served, and the district court never had personal jurisdiction over the
4

Incidentally, the alternative method of service selected by Plaintiff cannot be said
to be "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the
action" as required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(4)(B). Plaintiff had
already tried a substantially similar method without success. The alternative service in
this case is analogous to Jackson Construction where the publication was in Washington
County rather than at the defendants' last known address. Ultimately, allowing service by
mail amounted to unlawfully waiving the Fullingims' Due Process rights.
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Fullingims. Therefore, the default judgment entered by the clerk on October 14, 2003, is
void, and must be vacated.
— II —
T H E UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY A
DEPUTY COURT CLERK, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF

URCP RULE 55, RENDERS THAT JUDGMENT VOID.
In addition to its other fatal flaws—and sufficient in itself to invalidate it—the
October 2003 Default Judgment was entered, not by the district court, as prescribed by
URCP Rule 55, but by a deputy court clerk. According to URCP Rule 55, a clerk may
enter a default judgment only in certain quite limited and well-defined circumstances.
Those circumstances are not present in this case, and the default judgment is, as a result,
void and unenforceable.
URCP Rule 55 specifies that
Judgment by default may be entered as follows: ... Upon request of the
plaintiff the clerk shall enter [default] judgment for the amount claimed and
costs against the defendant if
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that
can be made certain by computation.
URCP Rule 55(b)(1) (emphasis added). "In all other cases'' the rule requires "the party
entitled to a judgment by default [to] apply to the court therefor." URCP Rule 55(b)(2)
(emphasis added).
In this case, the court clerk had no authority to enter default judgment because the

5

Jurisdiction can be raised at any time. State Tax Comm'n v. Larsen, 100 Utah
103, 110P.2d558,560(1941)
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conditions of the rule were not satisfied: the Fullingims were not "personally served
pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)," as required by rule 55(b)(1)(C). Unable to obtain personal
service, Smith Springs sought leave of the Court to effect alternative service. Alternative
service is not the personal service rule 55(b)(1)(C) calls for. And absent the required
personal service, authority for the clerk to enter default judgment did not exist. As has
been noted by other courts, court clerks possess 'Very limited jurisdiction to enter
judgments in civil actions." Boone v. Sparrow, 70 S.E.2d 204, 209 (N.C. 1952). In
Boone, the court determined that the court clerk "was without authority to sign a default
judgment." Id. The court held that "a judgment entered by a clerk ... in a case not
specified by statute ... is void and of no effect." Id. at 210. Federal courts have also noted
that "Rule 55 empowers the clerk to enter a default judgment at the request of the
plaintiff," upon satisfaction of all the conditions of the rule, Combs v. Coal & Mineral
Mgmt Servs., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1984), reducing the clerk's entry of
judgment to a "purely ... ministerial act." Id.
Utah Courts have themselves long recognized the judicial/ministerial distinction
between court and clerk now memorialized in Rule 55(b). As far back as 1874, in
Nounnan v. Toponce, 1 Utah 168 (Utah Territory 1874), the Utah Territorial Court
overturned a clerk's entry of default judgment due to the nonsatisfaction of certain
limited, prescribed conditions:
[I]n cases coming under the first subdivision of section 151 of the Practice
Act, and where it does not require the proof of any fact, [a clerk] may [enter
judgment on default].... [IJn doing this the Clerk acts ministerially and not
judicially.... [But] the case made by the [present] complaint is not one in
which the Clerk would be authorized to enter up judgment on default in
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vacation.
Id. (emphasis added) (A copy of this case is attached at Tab D). More recently, in Russell
v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), another case involving a clerk's improper entry of
default judgment, the Utah Supreme Court, in light of the defendant's indifference, lack
of diligence, and noncompliance with applicable rules, upheld the district court's denial
of relief from his default, id. at 1195, but reversed the clerk's entry of default judgment.
Courts are not at liberty[, instructed the Court,] to deviate from th[e] rules
just because one party is in default and is not entitled to be heard on the
merits of the case. For example, ... Rule 55(b)(2) ... provides that when the
plaintiffs claim is for other than a sum certain or an amount that by
computation can be made certain judgment by default may not be entered
by the clerk of the court, but must be entered by the court....
Id. Because all of the conditions listed in URCP Rule 55(b) were not met, the Court
concluded "that the judgment against Mills must be reversed ...." Id.\ see also Skanchy v.
Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998) ("A clerk of the court may enter a
default judgment if a defendant defaults and if the complaint seeks damages for a 'sum
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain.' However, if the
damages claimed are unliquidated, a default judgment can be entered only by a judge.")
In the present case, as in Nounnan and Martell (and Skanchy), a critical element
necessary for the court clerk to enter default judgment was missing when default
judgment was entered. Under Utah law, the district court clerk is empowered to enter
default judgment only if "the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule
4(d)(1)" and the other three Rule 55 conditions are met. URCP Rule 55(b)(1). The
Fullingims, of course, were never personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1), and the
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deputy court clerk consequently had no authority to enter default judgment. According to
the plain language of the rule, only the district court itself could have entered default
judgment. This court must therefore grant the FuUingims relief from void default
judgment of October 3, 2003.
Smith Springs's claim that this Court should overlook the court clerk's
unauthorized entry of judgment as "harmless error" (R. 131-32), actually undermines the
purpose of Rule 55. The drafters of the rule limited the power of the clerk advisedly,
evidently apprehending the potential injustice of a clerk entering default judgment against
a party who had never been "personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)," Rule
55(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added).6 In such a circumstance, the drafters determined that the
district court should directly review a motion for entry of default judgment. See Rule
55(b)(2). Given the opportunity to undertake such a review, the district court might have
realized, and ruled, that service by mail was not "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise the
[FuUingims] of the pendency of the action." See Rule 4(d)(4)(B).
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has further stated that "[generally, courts should
be liberal in granting relief against default judgment so that cases may be tried on the
merits." Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994).
Given this injunction to liberality, and because the default judgment was entered by the
district court deputy clerk in plain violation of applicable law, the default judgment must
be set aside and the case tried on the merits.
6

Note that Rule 55(b) explicitly calls for personal service. The service by
publication, upon which Smith Springs relies is "Other service" under Rule 4(d)(4), and
cannot satisfy the personal service mandated by Rule 55(b).
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— Ill —
RULE 60(B)'S TIMELINESS AND MERITORIOUS-DEFENSE
REQUIREMENTS DID N O T APPLY TO THE FULLINGIMS' M O T I O N
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.

Under certain circumstances, to successfully move for relief from judgment under
URCP Rule 60(b) entails satisfaction of the Rule's timeliness limitations ("The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3
months after the ... order ... was entered") and the judicial requirement that the moving
party "'show' that he or she 'has a meritorious defense to the action," that is, "a clear and
specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by
the claimant...," Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ffl[28-29, 11 P.3d 277 (quoting State ex rel
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselrnan, 667 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1983)) (quotation marks
omitted); Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1148.
The district court based its denial of the Fullingims' motion for relief in part upon
its determinations that the Fullingims "failed to file request for relief from judgment
within the allotted 3 month period" and "failed to proffer a meritorious defense that
would justify a trial on the issues raised" (R. 191). The district court erred greatly on
these two points, however, since, where a 60(b) motion is based upon a judgment's being
void for lack of personal jurisdiction, such requirements do not pertain.
In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986), Mrs. Garcia obtained a divorce
while Mr. Garcia was in Prison. Service was made upon "Mr. Johnson, head of State
Prison personnel office." 712 P.2d at 289. A default judgment was entered on March 14,
1973, which Mr. Johnson challenged ten years later in 1983, after his release, asserting
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under Rule 60(b) that he had never been properly served. The district court denied relief,
but the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Holding the "attempted service on [Mr. Garcia] ...
fatally defective," id. at 290, the Court explained that "where [a] judgment is void
because of a fatally defective service of process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have
no application" id. (citing Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249, 461 P.2d 465 (1969))
(emphasis added):
[Tjhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The [threemonth] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made within a
"reasonable time" ... cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion.
A void judgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on the part of
the judgment debtor.
Id. at 290-91 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862).
"Nor is there," the Court continued, "any requirement, as there usually is when
default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the moving party show that he has a
meritorious defense. Either a judgment is void or it is valid" Id. at 291 (quoting Wright
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862 ("FPP") (emphasis added).
And, since a void judgment has by definition no validity, "[t]here is no question of
discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4)." Id. at 290
(quoting FPP); Jackson Constr., 2004 UT 89, at f8. A district court must undertake the
required analysis regardless of elapsed time or potential merit. "Determining which it is
[void or valid] may well present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved,
the court must act accordingly." Id. at 291 (quoting FPP). A void judgment must be set
aside, again, without regard to how long it has been since the judgment in question was
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rendered or the perceived merit or meritlessness in the eyes of the district court judge.
Ultimately, if failure of proper service deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enter
the default judgment (even assuming the district court, not a deputy clerk, properly
entered the judgment), that judgment must now be set aside regardless of any other fact.
As the district court clearly erred by applying inapplicable requirements, this
Court, therefore, should set aside the default judgment entered against the Fullingims.
The default judgment is void for lack of effective service, and there is neither a time limit
nor a meritorious defense requirement to set aside a void judgment. Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding" if "the judgment is void." URCP Rule 60(b)(4). The Utah Supreme Court
has further stated that "[generally, courts should be liberal in granting relief against
default judgment so that cases may be tried on the merits. Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149.
CONCLUSION

7

Should this Court somehow determine that there is a "meritorious defense"
requirement in the present matter, the Fullingim explained its defenses in their Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment, which was filed with the
trial court on February 23, 2005, asserting that no contractual arrangement existed to
obligate them to pay Smith Springs for water service and that they held their own water
rights to withdraw water pursuant to a contract with Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District. (R. at 181.) Although the Fullingims provided minimal information for their
defenses, the information is sufficient to meet that minimal burden under Erickson, 882
P.2d at 1149: "A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside
if it is entitled to be tried." See also Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545
P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976) overruled in part on other grounds by Mgmt. Servs. v. Dev.
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980) ("[0]ne who seeks to vacate a default judgment must
proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the
issue thus raised.").
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Smith Springs knew that the FuUingims had retained local counsel specifically to
deal with the dispute that became the subject of Smith Springs' complaint. However,
Smith Springs made no attempt to contact the FuUingims' counsel and did not disclose its
knowledge to the district court. By turning a blind eye to this readily available option,
Smith Springs failed to fulfill the "reasonable diligence requirement," and should not
have been granted leave to use alternative service. By these actions, the district court's
jurisdiction was improperly invoked, and the Default Judgment should be set aside as
void. In addition, the Default Judgment is void because it was entered by the deputy court
clerk, exceeding the boundaries of the clerk's limited authority. For these reasons, the
FuUingims respectfully request this Court to overturn the district court's denial of their
Motion for Relief from Judgment and direct the district court to enter an order setting
aside the Default Judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 7j\

clay of April, 2006.
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

J. Craj£
-SctSftM
R. Christopher Preston
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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Tab A

Rule 4. Process.
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and complaint
shall be by one of the following methods:
(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any state or
judicial district of the United States by the sheriff or constable or by the deputy of either,
by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of
age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. If the
person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if
the person serving the same shall state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy
thereof. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or (D)
below, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the individual
personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a
copy of the summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process;
(d)(1)(B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or
guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care and
control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is
employed;
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or incapable of
conducting the person's own affairs, by delivering a copy of the summons and the
complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed
and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody
or control of the person;
(d)(1)(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state
or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy of the summons and the
complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to
be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process
to the individual served;
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or
upon an unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general
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agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process
and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires,
by also mailing a copy of the summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such
officer or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or
holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or
does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office
or place of business;
(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the summons and
the complaint to the recorder;
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the
county clerk of such county;
(d)(1)(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the superintendent or business administrator of the board;
(d)(l)(I) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the summons and
the complaint to the president or secretary of its board;
(d)(l)(J) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be brought
against the state, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the attorney
general and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and
(d)(l)(K) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public board,
commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and the
complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or
secretary.
(d)(2) Service by mail or commercial courier service.
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other than one
covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(B) or (d)(1)(C) by mail or commercial courier service in
any state or judicial district of the United States provided the defendant signs a document
indicating receipt.
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered by
paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)(l)(I) by mail or commercial courier service in any state
or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt.
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on the date the
receipt is signed as provided by this rule.
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(d)(3) Service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows:
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such
as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents;
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable
international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is reasonably
calculated to give notice:
(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
(d)(3)(B)(ii) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter
of request; or
(d)(3)(B)(iii) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery to the
individual personally of a copy of the summons and the complaint or by any form of mail
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the
party to be served; or
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by
the court.
(d)(4) Other service.
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and
cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the
individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or where there exists good
cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party
seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order
allowing service by publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall
set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties.
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by publication
or by other means, provided that the means of notice employed shall be reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency
of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The court's order shall also
specify the content of the process to be served and the event or events as of which service
shall be deemed complete. Unless service is by publication, a copy of the court's order
shall be served upon the defendant with the process specified by the court.
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(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the court shall,
upon the request of the party applying for publication, designate the newspaper in which
publication shall be made. The newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and shall be
published in the English language.
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(b) Service: How made and by whom.
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless
service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party
shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if
no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court.
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the
party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge thereof; or, if
there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is
closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein; or, if consented to in writing by the person to be served, delivering a copy by
electronic or other means.
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of a
hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, service
shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by electronic means is
complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal business hours at
the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on the next business day.
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if :
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made
certain by computation.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply
to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into
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effect. it is neeesNaiv to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to
establish the trutl ol any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of an>
, the court may enndud MK-1; hearings or order such references as it deems
md proper.
aside defaui.. r or gout'
\.w tii^ ~> ».;. ..iu\ ->CL abide ai, u;u^
if a judgment by defa
wen entered, ma\ likewise set il aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).
'hiniiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply
ty entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff,
has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by
default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default
il
be entered against the state of T Jtah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
LAIC H C t k 3 VJ

II ule 60 II elief fi Dm ju dgm ent a it • a i dei
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record.
and errors Ihercu* arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any; as the
* orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before
^al is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
w%
corrected with leave of the appellate court
(b)
s; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, cic < •
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieu
• i v r t\ or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
inwing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
%
. covered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
-• * e for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
H ar extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
uh M..Mi is \oiii, i5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
•Mil upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
:! : : s not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
<er of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
ji .• igr / = iril: order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. * uc
p : • : • : • i t : for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
th = se i ules or by an independent action.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SMITH SPRINGS LLC vs. KRISTIN E FULLINGIM
<\SE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights

JRRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
PARLEY R. BAI ,DWIN
ARTiHiJ
Plaintiff - SMITH SPRINGS LLC
SLC, UT 841 01
Defendant - KRISTIN El E I JLI .INGIM
DALLAS, TX 75248
Represented by; J.. CRAIG SMITH
Defendant - JOHN P FULLINGIM
DALLAS, TX 7 5248
Represented by: J. CRAIG SMITH
X O i J N I SUMMARY

TOTAI i REVENUE

.Amount Due :
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

BA11 /CAS H BONDS

REVENUE DETAIL

Posted:
Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

2 7 0.00
270.00
0.00
0.00
300.00
0.00
0.00
300 00

TYPE: COMPLAINT 0K-2K

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

45,.00
45,.00
0,.00
0..00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0,.50
0,.50
0,.00
0,.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:

13 .00

tp://168.177.211 52/casesearch /CaseSearch?action= :casel list
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:ASE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

11.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00
5.50
5.50
0.00
0.00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Civil, Mi
Posted By: J. CRAIG SMITH
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00
CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
09-13-02
09-13-02
09-13-02
09-13-02
09-13-02

Case filed
Judge BALDWIN assigned.
Filed: Complaint
45.00
Total Due:
Fee Account created
45.00
Payment Received:
COMPLAINT 0K-2K
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 0K-2K
02-12-03 Notice - Order of Dismissal for Case 020906507
Based on a review of this file and Rule 4(b) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court orders this case be dismissed, without
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ASE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights

p r e j u d i c e , for failure to serve t h e d e f e n d a n t withii I 12 0 days of
filing t h e C o m p l a i n t .
2-12-03 Case D i s p o s i t i o n is Dismissed
debbiel
D i s p o s i t i o n Judge is PARLEY R. B A L D W I N
debbiel
2-12-03 Filed o r d e r : Order of Dismissal
Judge
pbaldwin
Signed February 1 2 , 2003
3-10-03 Filed: First amended complaint
3-10-03 Filed: M o t i o n for Service b y P u b l i c a t i o n and/or b y M a i l
3-10-03 N o t e : Rec'd O r d e r Granting S e r v i c e b y Publication and/or b y
Mail
3-10-03 Filed: Affidav it of A n d r e a Dovei •
3-17-03 N o t e : file sent to PRB
3-18-03 N o t e : Dana Farmer is notified to submit a m o t i o n t o set a s i d e
dismissal.
3-21-03 Filed: Notice to Submit on E x - P a r t e M o t i o n to R e i n s t a t e
Plaintiff's Comp1a int and Mot ion f o Serve by Pub1icat ion a n d / o r
by Mail
3-21-03 Filed: M e m o r a n d u m in Support of Motion. to Reinstate P1 a i n t i f f ' s
Complaint
3-21-03 Filed: Ex-Parte M o t i o n to R e i n s t a t e P l a i n t i f f s C o m p l a i n t
3-21-03 Filed: M o t i o n for Service b y Publicatii on and/or b y Ma: 1
3-21-03 Filed: A f f i d a v i t of A n d r e a Dover
3-24-03 Tracking started for Under a d v i s e m e n t , Review date M a y 2 3 ,
2003.
3-28-03 N o t e : file sent to PRB
5-15-03 Fi ] ed o r d e r : M e m o r a n d u m Decis:i on
Judge
pbaldwin
Signed A p r i l 1 4 , 2003
2-15-03 Filed o r d e r : M e m o r a n d u m Decision
Judge
pbaldwin
Signed A p r i l 1 4 , 2003
5-15-03 Tracking ended for Under a d v i s e m e n t .
1-21-03 N o t e : R e c ' d O r d e r Granting M o t i o n t o R e i n s t a t e P l a i n t i f f ' s
Complaint
3-06-03 N o t e : file sent to PRB
3-14-03 Filed o r d e r : Order G r a. n. 1: :i i I g M : 1: :i : i I 1: : R e i n s t a. t e PI a i n t i f f ' s
Complaint
Judge
pbaldwin
Signed M a y 1 2 , 2003
5-0 6-03 N o t e : O r d e r G r a n t i n g Service b y P u b l i c a t i o n and/or by m a i l
placed in Judge PRB's basket for s i g n a t u r e with file.
5-10-03 Filed o r d e r : O r d e r Granting Service b y P u b l i c a t i o n a n d / o r b y
Mai I
Judge
pbaldwin
Signed June 0 9 , 2003
5-25-03 Filed: Proof of Service
J-20-03 Filed: Cost: m e m o
1-2 0-03 Filed: M e m o r a n d u m in Support of Ex Parte
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Page 3

tp://168.177.211.52/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseI list

4 13/2006

Page 4 of5

:ASE NUMBER 020906507 Water Rights

)8-20-03 Issued: Default Certificate
Clerk harrietb
)8-20-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020906507 ID 8199012
We are unable to enter the default judgment/certificate in this
case for the following reasons:
Notes: We do not have any service of process in the file.
Apparently you served by mail. You can not charge the defendant for
postage, except the certification fee. Amended Complaint states
principal to be $900, but the Judgment shows $960. Successor
Agreem 1 t?

Dated this

day of

, 20_

District Court Clerk
L0-03-03 Filed: (Amended) Cost memo
LO-14-03 Judgment #1 Entered
Creditor: SMITH SPRINGS LLC
Debtor:
JOHN P FULLINGIM
Debtor:
KRISTIN E FULLINGIM
1,587.84 Total Judgment
1,587.84 Judgment Grand Total
L0-14-03 Filed judgment: Default Judgment/3.41% Per Annum
Clerk harrietb
Signed October 03, 2003
LO-15-03 Case Disposition is Judgment
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R. BALDWIN
L0-29-03 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.50
LO-29-03 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.50
Ll-04-03 Note: Rec'd Order
Ll-04-03 Filed: First Amended Complaint
Ll-12-03 Note: file sent to PRB
Ll-20-03 Filed order: Order
Judge pbaldwin
Signed November 17, 2003
L2-05-03 Filed: Notice of withdrawal , as counsel - Dana T Famer for
Smith Springs lie
10-29-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
11.00
L0-29-04 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
11.00
11-01-04 Filed: Notice of Appearance- Atty Hartvigsen- John Fullingim
11-01-04 Filed: Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel
31-11-05 Filed: Motion for relief from judgment
01-11-05 Filed: Memo in support of motion for relief from judgment
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1-11-05
1-11-05
1-31-05
1-31-05
2-10-05
2-23-05
2-24-05
2-25-05
4-26-05
4-2 6-05

5-09-05
5-16-05
5-24-05
5-27-05
5-02-05

5-07-05
5-07-05
7-05-05
7-05-05
7-05-05
7-05-05
7-12-05
7-12-05
7-12-05
7-12-05
7-12-05
7-20-05
3-11-05
)-23-05
a-23-05

Filed: Affidavit of John P Fullingim
Filed: Affidavit of Steven E Clyde
Fee Account created
Total Due.
2.. 00
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.00
Filed: Memorandum, in opposition to defendants motion for relief
from judgment
Exiled: RepJ y TmnnorHndum in :;u(>jx»it nil nrnl ion |ni N'lief from
judgment
Filed: Request to Submit Defendant" :i "Motion 1 OJ Holier from
Judgment" for Decision
Tracking started for Under advisement,. Review date Apr 26,
2005,
Tracking ended for Under advisement.
Filed order: Memorandum Decision
Judge pbaldwin
Signed April 26, 2005
Note: Received, Order D e n y :i n g D e f e n d a i I 1: s I: 3 o t:„ ,:i :) i I f o r I i e J :i e f f r o in
Judgment
Note: FILE TO PRB
Note: Order held waiting for mailing certificate.
Filed: Letter, with attached Certificate of Mailing
Filed order: Order Denying Defendants Motion for Re 1 ;- * •
Judgment
Judge pbaldwin
Signed June 01, 2005
Fee Account created
Total Due:
300
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
"OPY FEE, Faxed copies (included with another case)
Fiieu: Notice of Appeal
Filed: CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS NOT REQUIRED
Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL
Filed: NOTICE OF FILING COST BOND ON 1 uE E EAL
Fee Account created.
Total Due:
205.00
APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL, Mail Payment;
Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
Note: COST BOND
Bond, Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
Note: COST BOND, Mail Payment;
Filed: Letter from Supreme Court
Filed: Letter from the Utah Court of Appeals #20050621
Fee Account created.
Total Due:
5 50
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
5 50
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
RULES BEFORE CITING.

CHECK

COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah
STA IE of Utah, Division of Child and IMIIJ::;.
Services, Respondent and Appellant,
v.
Z.F., Petitioner and Appenee.
No. 20001084-CA.
\p.» - 9 . 2 0 0 1 .
Mark L. Shurtlefl. Carv! L. Verdoia, and Jeffrey S.
Buckner, SaltLak* '* " r ^ » n « . n , ^ L
Douglas J. Parry and Jennifer i , i.ange, Salt Lake
("n\ ffn .ippellee
Heioie

•iRH;N\\m -

... .

-

I, < in< I OR I IE.

JJ.

PER CI J RIAM.
"! I'h-- Division of Child ar.J i";tmi!\ Service(DCFS) appeals from an order (1) dismissing / f
complaint seeking judicial review oil inform..:
agency action and (2) transferring the case io the
juvenile court. The case is before this court oi.
Z.F.'s motion for summary dismissal, on DCiS^
motion for partial summary reversal, and on / I
motions to strike l ^ 1 ^ ' m *M . ^ -i«, i ; i. .—i.
We deny both motions v
-~+;~~
for partial summary reve
^ . _
10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
the reply memorandum was allowed under Rule 23
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We also
deny Z.F.'s motion to dismiss the appeal because we
conclude that the order dismissing the case and
transferring it to juvenile court was final and
appealable.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

DCFS seeks partial reversal of the district coin t's
order, which would preserve the dismissal, but
reverse the transfer. If the DCFS motion is granted,
the effect would be to leave dismissal as the
disposition in district court contrary to the intent of
that court. We agree that the district court could not
simultaneously dismiss the case, and transfer it to
the juvenile court. However, based upon :n it
determination that the district court had subje ct
matter jurisdiction and erred in both the dismissal
and the transfer, we reverse the order and remand
for further proceedings in district court.
Z.r. nled a timely compia
,
seeking judicial review of it,
y action
At that time, Utah Code Ann. $ o3-46b-15; <
(1997) gave the district court jurisdiction "to review
by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting
from informal adjudicative proceedings," with the
exception that the juvenile court had jurisdiction in
actions relating to removal or placement of children
in state custody or the support of those children.
The agency decision advised Z.F. that he could seek
judicial review in the district court. An amendment
to the statute, effective May 3, 1999, gave the
juvenile court jurisdiction to review actions relating
to "substantiated findings of abuse or neglect
pursuant to [Utah Code Ann. § ] 62A-4a-116.5."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(l)(a)(iii) (Supp.2000).
DCFS argued that the district court automatically
lost jurisdiction over Z.F.'s complaint, although it
was filed roughly one month before the
amendment's effective date. I he Utah Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument, in National Parks
& Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869
P.2d 909 (Utah 1993), holding that the statute in
effect when a petition seeking judicial review of
agency action was filed established the court's
subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 912. The court
concluded that n[o]nce a court has acquired
jurisdiction of a case, jurisdiction is not
extinguished by subsequent legislative action" ai id
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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an amendment to its jurisdictional statute "did not
divest this Court of jurisdiction over this case
because jurisdiction attached under the statute in
effect when the petition for review was filed." Id.
DCFS's reliance on Department of Social Services
v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982), is misplaced.
Higgs distinguished cases where a complaint was
filed after the effective date of the repealed
jurisdictional provision, as in Higgs, from cases
where a complaint was filed before the effective
date of the amendment, as in the present case. See
id. at 1001. Accordingly, the court stated that "once
a reviewing court's jurisdiction had attached in a
case, an action repealing the jurisdiction of the
court in question was not intended to divest that
court of jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Industrial
Comm'n v. Agee, 56 Utah 63, 189 P.2d 414 (1920)).
Under well-settled law, the district court was not
divested of jurisdiction on the effective date of the
amendment, and DCFS's argument did not support
dismissal of Z.F.'s complaint.
*2 DCFS argues that even if the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction under the statute in effect
when the complaint was filed, its jurisdiction
terminated when Z.F. failed to serve the complaint
on DCFS within 120 days. See Utah R.Civ.P. 4(a).
Although Rule 4(a) states that an action shall be
dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to timely
serve a summons and complaint, the court may
extend the time for service under Rule 6(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even if the time has
expired. See Callahan v. Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259,
1262 (Utah Ct.App.1994). "Unless and until a cause
of action is dismissed, a party who fails to serve a
summons in a timely fashion may preserve the
action under proper circumstances." Id. The trial
court granted Z.F.'s motion to extend time for
service, without objection by DCFS. Two months
later, DCFS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, which collaterally attacked the earlier
ruling by arguing that the complaint should be
dismissed for failure to perfect service within 120
days and that the district court could not extend the
time for service.

time to serve the defendants based upon a finding of
good cause and excusable neglect. See Utah
R.Civ.P. 6(b). The district court's excusable neglect
"inquiry is fundamentally equitable in nature and
entails broad discretion." Serrato v. Utah Transit
Authority, 2000 UT App 299, & para; 10, 414 Utah
Adv. Rep. 43. There is no evidence of bad faith; the
delay in service was not extensive; upon discovery
that his original counsel had not served the
complaint, Z.F. and substitute counsel acted
diligently to accomplish service. There appears to
be no prejudice to DCFS, other than being required
to respond to the merits of the complaint. See id. at
& para;9. In contrast, dismissal of the complaint,
coupled with the expiration of the time for seeking
judicial review, would deny Z.F. the opportunity for
judicial review.
Finally, we conclude the district court could not
transfer the pending case to the juvenile court for
determination. The district court's authority to
certify issues to the juvenile court is limited to
questions of "support, custody, and visitation"
where a petition involving the same minor is
pending in juvenile court or the juvenile court has
previously acquired continuing jurisdiction over the
minor. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-105(3)(b)
(Supp.2000). A complaint seeking judicial review
of the substantiated finding that Z.F. was
"substantially responsible" for child abuse is not
within this transfer provision. Because the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
complaint, it should have retained the case for
determination on the merits.
We reverse the order dismissing and transferring
the case, and remand to the district court for further
proceedings on the merits of the complaint.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 422947 (Utah
App.), 2001 UT App 132
END OF DOCUMENT

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction
over the case and could grant an extension of the
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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C
Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.
1
\MF.S H N^>J ! N \ ^ N Respondent,
ALLXANOhk iOPONCI-:. Appellant.
May Term, 1874,
West Headnotes
judgment €=>126(1)
228k 126(1) Most Cited Cases
Where an action sounds in tort, and the complaint
does not furnish the measure of damages, but leaves
the question open for proof, the clerk of the court
cannot enter a judgment by default, and a judgment
so entered is a nullity,
I
)

I lost Cited Cases
a judgment by default, the clerk acts

Judgment €=>143(16)
228kl43(16) Most Cited Cases
On a motion to set aside default and judgment, tl ic
affidavit showed that defendant could not read
writing; that, when the summons and complaint
were served on him, he consulted his friend and
business partner as to what was necessary to be
done, and, being incorrectly informed, let the case
go by default; that defendant had a good defense to
the action, and produced an answer that he desired
to file. Held, that the default should be set aside,
and the judgment vacated,
*1 APPEAL from the Third Judicial District.
"I he Respondent brought his action in the \\w\A
District Court to recover the value of his inter*, -J I
a certain lot of Railroad ties, of which the Apprh;-r:
and he were joint owners, alleging that A p p a l l had sold the ties and used the money Affef A •

personal VJ\ICC, «.:. un:v : : ,..;•> u...,
expired, tin* Respondent took judgment
Clerk's office by default.

. ...^
in the

To set aside judgment by default and for leave to
answer, the Appellant filed his motion in the Court
below; which motion, after argument by Counsel
and consideration by the Court, was overruled. To
reverse the .-*rtinn . f t!u> Prmrt Helow this appeal is
taken,
Hempstead»V- Kit-kr>i u • L i] • * •, •.- f:, 11;
-',

v

-^

s

ondent.

P.MLRSON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
L.rroi is assigned :;t this case upon five grounds,
namely:
I; i rs i ilu- • ' • ui i: ^ n cd in o verru 1 ing D efendant's
motion, to set aside said judgment and till me
proceedings thereunder, and open said default.
5kXwnu,

im-it

\^u^ n u iCgal 01 VUI1U s c ! v i, _

summons upon the defendant in said action
i::ii\.. baio dclauit anJ judgment were enkw
vacation b> the Clerk without authority of law.
Fou??th. Because the court h,uJ n*; _ir: OK\render judgment in said action, the ^anic K M»Isoleh -oirni/ablc :r \ir : t'
Fifth. Because the evidence on said motion
established a case of mistake inadvertence and
excusable neglect on the part of Defendant, and a
m eritor i ous de fen ce.
The facts set forth upon which the application was
based do not show any neglect, excusable or
otherwise, on the part of the Appellant; it was a
misunderstanding or n listake as to what was

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to (>ri:: i f.S < io\ t Works.
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required of him. They do show, however, the very
contrary of any negligence on the part of the
appellant after being informed of the state of the
case, and the real nature of the proceedings against
him.
The record discloses that as soon as his mistake
was discovered, he was very prompt and persistent
in his application to the Court for the relief which I
think he ought to have had.
The first and fifth assignments of error have
reference to the refusal of the Court to set aside the
judgment and default, and to permit the Defendant
to answer.
The granting or refusal of applications of this kind
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court,
yet its power should be exercised freely and
liberally, under the sections of the act permitting
this to be done.
The affidavit upon which this motion was based,
shows clearly that the default and judgment were
taken against the Appellant, by reason of his
mistake as to the nature of the process served upon
him. The Appellant can not read writing, and when
the summons was served, he called upon his friend
and former business partner to explain its nature
and effect. The information he then received was
incorrect, and very naturally, under the
circumstances detailed in the affidavit, led him to
believe that there was no necessity for his action in
the matter.
*2 The whole conduct of the Appellant, in
reference to this matter, as evidenced by the record,,
shows that he acted in the utmost good faith, and
perfectly consistent with the representations made,
and upon which the motion is based. His affidavit
shows that he has a meritorious defence, and his
application was accompanied by the answer which
he proposed to file in the case.
The answer contains matter, which if established
upon trial would be a complete defence upon the
merits, to the case made in the complaint.

The further good faith of the Appellant is shown in
the fact, which appears in the record, that at the
hearing of the application he proposed to waive,
and did waive, what he and his Counsel believed to
be a valid objection to the service of the summons,
thus showing that his only desire was to go to trial
upon the merits of the case.
While I would not ordinarily consent to interfere
where the Court below has only exercised its
discretionary power, I am satisfied that to refuse to
do so in this case would result in a manner to
impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. I
think the case presented to the Court below, was
such an one as called for its equitable interposition,
such an interposition as is contemplated by the act,
and that the application should have been granted.
The conclusion to which I have come in reference
to the first and fifth assignments of error, renders it
unnecessary to enter into any extended examination
of the other points raised in the record.
So far as the second assignment is concerned, I am
not prepared to say, but that the objection could be
raised upon the appeal from the judgment,
notwithstanding it was waived upon the motion to
set aside the judgment and open the default. I
understand that the obligation was waived after the
judgment was taken by default for want of an
appearance and answer, and for the purposes of the
motion to set aside the judgment and default, and
for that only.
As the Appellant was not allowed to appear, there
was no waiver on his part of any irregularity in the
service of the summons, if there was any, by an
appearance.
I have very grave doubts of there being any validity
in the objection itself. And as it will make no
difference in the final determination of this case
what my views are in regard to this point, I decline
to express any opinion in regard to it, preferring to
consider it in some case, if such an one shall arise,
where it is a material point in the decision of the
case.
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Its determination would require an examination
into the whole doctrine of de facto officers, and I
prefer thai it should be after a more elaborate
argument 'ruin was n^uk m ihi-. . .i ,-.• -HH ^: \h ^

The third assignment of error denies the right of the
Clerk to enter judgment on default in vacation. I am
clearly of the opinion that in cases coming under the
first subdivision of section 151 of the Practice Act,
and where it does not require the proof of any fact,
this may be done.
*3 It has been so held in States where the whole
judicial power is conferred upon the Courts in their
fundamental law, and certainly the Organic Act of
the Territory can not be, in this respect, a more
sacred instrument than a State Constitution. That is
to say, a. State Legislature is as much restrained
from conferring this power upon the Clerk, under a
State Constitution, conferring ail judicial power
upon the Courts, as the Territorial Legislature is
i inder the Organic Act
The weight of authority is that in doing' this the
Clerk acts tn inisterial ly and not j ud ic ially.
I am also clearly of the opinion, that the case made
by the complaint is not one in which the Clerk
would be authorized to enter up judgment on
default in vacation.
I he action sounds in tort. It is for the conversion of
certain railroad ties. The contract set up in the
complaint does not furnish the measure of damages.
The market value of the ties at the time of their
conversion is the true measure of the Plaintiffs
damages. The price for which they were sold is only
evidence tending to show what that was. It required
proof to establish what the market value was, and
fix the amount for which the Plaintiff could recover.
The Clerk had no power to take this proof. The
judgment is therefor a nullity, but as it encumbers
the record, the Appellant has a right to have it
removed
.: uu
" •• •

neither the complaint nor summons specifies the
time from which interest is demanded, the Clerk
could not enter judgment on default for the interest,
as it would require proof to fix the time from which
it should be 'reckoned. If the judgment were
otherwise valid, however, this would simply be an.
error which could be corrected by this Court on
appeal.
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The judgment of the Court below in refusing to set
aside the judgment and default, is reversed, and the
judgment and default are set aside. The Appellant to
be permitted to file his answer to the complaint,
upon the payment by him of the taxable costs of the
Plaintiff, up to, and including the judgment by
default.
Provided, That within two days after notice served
upon the Attorney for the Respondent, of the filing
of the remittitur from this Court, with the Clerk of
the Third District Court the Respondent or his
Attorney file with said Clerk of the Third District
Court a sworn memoranda of the costs in that Court
up to and including the judgment by default; if no
such memoranda is filed within the time mentioned
then the Appellant to have permission to file his
answer. The Appellor- ~ \:--K \--: *!K- -:oslh i-'' '
appeal.
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